constitutional and military context in which the British army acted as a detaining authority in Iraq. I then examine accounts that have emerged regarding physical violence in sites of detention and detail the deaths that occurred in British custody. Thereafter, through reference to domestic proceedings, I identify an accountability deficit for violence that occurred in British sites of detention in Iraq. I argue that serious deficits with such proceedings have failed to make the situation inadmissible before the International Criminal Court (ICC), and that the prosecutor has a legitimate basis to reopen the preliminary examination into the matter. Whilst the UK may not be a transitional society emerging from conflict, it was involved in the 'transformative occupation' of Iraq and during that occupation promote human rights in the country. 21 UNAMI reported to the UNSC pursuant to UNSCR 1546, and in June 2005 it noted with concern that approximately 6,000 detainees were being held by MNF without due process and without access to lawyers, in violation of international law. 22 Earlier, a leaked International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) report highlighted detainee ill-treatment in coalition-run detention facilities. These abuses were not isolated to the US Abu Ghraib detention facility and included the mistreatment of detainees in British-controlled facilities. The US-UK military partnership was also reflected in the administration of some detention facilities. Mark Urban maintains that UK special forces transferred prisoners to the US facility at Camp Nama, located west of Baghdad airport, where abuse was normalized and detainees 'showed signs of having been mistreated (beaten) by their captors.' 29 After interviewing a suspect at a black site near Balad, the British intelligence agency MI6 raised concerns about detainee mistreatment. Consequently, Britain submitted a national caveat whereby its forces 'would not hand over prisoners to the Americans if they were going to be detained at the Balad black site.'
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In addition, there was complicity between US and UK special forces in managing at least two other secret detention facilities: H1, located at an oil pumping station in the desert (precise location unknown), and Station 22, located at a phosphate mine near the town of Al-Qaim. 31 Both sites were hidden from the ICRC and senior legal advisors in the British army. Violence, threats and coercion were prohibited means of gathering intelligence; a POW was only obliged to divulge his name, rank and date of birth.
All POWs had their status confirmed by a competent tribunal, as per Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention.
When the formal occupation ended, people arrested and held in custody were categorized either as 'security internees' or 'criminal detainees.' Generally, there were two sets of circumstances in which arrests by the British military could lead to internment.
Firstly, through 'pre-planned lift operations,' where the targets to be arrested and detained were identified in advance of the military operation. Alternatively, the internment of suspects sometimes occurred as a byproduct of military operations on the ground. Once arrested, the individual was considered a 'detainee' prior to further assessment, at which point he or 32 There was also a fourth category of 'voluntary detainee' -people who entered the camp voluntarily for protective custody. 33 An aide-mémoire containing instructions on internment procedures was issued to all brigade and battalion commanders. Moreover, it reminded commanders of the occupying powers' obligations towards civilians, 'including in respect of the practice of their religion, avoiding discrimination, and protection from violence, insults and public curiosity.' were not supposed to be interrogated prior to transfer to the TIF. However, FRAGO 29 blurred the lines as to what was permissible at battle group level. During a public inquiry into a custodial death, the Ministry of Defence admitted that the extraction of intelligence by 37 Criminal detainees had limited access to lawyers; 'security internees' could access a quasi-legal review of their detention. 38 According to these accounts, detainees were exposed to racist and homophobic language, and subjected to sexual, cultural and religious abuse. These were not random acts. The strategic use of humiliation, combined with physical techniques, was designed to erode detainees' defences to make them compliant with the regime and more malleable to interrogation. disorientation that could be exploited during interrogation. A hessian sack was placed over the detainee's head and sometimes goggles and earmuffs were employed, often in combination with severe isolation, restricted movement (flexicuffs) and other techniques.
Out of a sample of 85 former detainees, 34 were allegedly hooded in 59 separate incidents, and in one case two detainees were allegedly hooded and tightly handcuffed whilst confined in a tent for one month. Food and water deprivation was another element of detainee conditioning in Iraq. Of a representative sample of 109 claimants, 33 alleged food deprivation and 68 claimed that they were refused water or given inadequate amounts of water. 54 The consequences of this were extremely serious in Iraq. Although the body can go for some days without food, it starts 'to burn fat and muscle relatively quickly and cannot last longer than a few hours without water in normal temperatures without suffering ill-effects.' In the 53 Ibid., para. 8.153. 54 ECCHR and PIL, supra n 40. 55 Notably, a number of soldiers revealed that they had witnessed detainees being abused at the TDF. One soldier observed that Donald Payne, the provost corporal in charge of the detention facility, singled out Kifah Matairi for particular abuse. The entries reveal that at least 17 civilians were assaulted or mistreated over a three-month period.
Five soldiers and one officer are implicated in the incidents. Other members of the Rodgers Multiple confirmed the general patterns of violence depicted in the diary, and some corroborated specific events detailed therein. 72 Ibid., para. 3.60. 73 Ibid., paras. 3.61, 3.68.
<A>DEATHS IN CUSTODY
Article 2 of the ECHR protects the right to life of everyone within the state party's territory. A leaked RAF report revealed that prisoners on the helicopter 'were assaulted while they were handcuffed, hooded, and were knelt on if they "refused to adopt the required position".'
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There were two distinct legal services operating in Iraq, the Army Legal Services with its own chain of command, and the Ministry of Defence Legal Advisers (MODLA), composed of civilian lawyers that take precedence in a situation of war.
The latter agency controlled the inquiry into Sabri's death, but it was 'highly irregular' for MODLA, which was neither impartial nor independent, to have taken charge of an investigation of this nature. 82 Rose, supra n 31. 83 Ibid. the case because Sabri was being transported to an illegal detention site under the joint management of US and UK forces, but concealed from the ICRC and British Army Legal Services. 84 In another case, British soldiers mistakenly arrested Radhi Nama at his home in May 2003. Nama was taken to Camp Stephen, where he was reportedly 'softened up' for interrogation. Within hours of arriving at the base, Nama was dead. His death certificate, signed by someone without the appropriate medical qualification, indicated that the cause of death was cardiac failure. The RMP subsequently concluded that he had died of natural causes. 85 Recently, IHAT confirmed that the RMP investigation into Nama's death had not been 'sufficiently thorough' and was thus 'incomplete.' The manual explains the core military responsibilities regarding such 89 Kerr, supra n 74. 90 Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, Appl. no. 55721/07, Judgment (7 July 2011), para. 25. 91 Ibid., para. 27. 92 Ibid. . 94 Al-Skeini and Others, supra n 90 at para. 92, citing art. 121 of the Third Geneva Convention. 95 Al-Skeini and Others, supra n 90 at para. 92. 96 Ibid. been under British control. 97 In addition, the Court affirmed that Article 2 obligations continue even in the difficult circumstances of conflict, whereby 'all reasonable steps must be taken to ensure that an effective, independent investigation is conducted into the alleged breaches of the right to life.' 98 In reaching its decision, the Court drew from various sources, European case law has elaborated the procedural limb of Article 2 to incorporate four important cornerstones: independence, promptness, efficacy and accessibility. 102 In Al-Skeini, the Court ruled that an 'independent examination' ought to be accessible to both the victim's family and the wider public and capable of investigating 'broader issues of State responsibility, for the death, including the instructions, training and supervision given to soldiers undertaking tasks such as this in the aftermath of the invasion.' 103 An Article 2 compliant investigation ought to be 'broad enough' to allow investigators to consider not only the use of lethal force by agents of the state but also 'all the surrounding circumstances,' including the planning and management of ground operations. 104 When considering the second Ali Zaki Mousa (2013) application, Justice Stephen
Silber ruled that the investigation should include a 'lessons learned' mandate, which might be able to identify wider systemic issues. 105 by the security forces in Iraq, including deaths in custody. By 31 December 2015, IHAT had assumed responsibility for investigating 283 allegations of unlawful killing and 1,267 cases of ill-treatment, although it is not indicated what percentage of each category occurred in detention. 110 In 2011 the High Court raised questions regarding the structural and practical independence of IHAT, leading to a massive system overhaul. 111 Thereafter, the three main functions of IHAT were articulated as investigative, prosecutorial and reporting on wider systemic issues.
Notwithstanding these structural reforms, the Ali Zaki Mousa claimants maintained that the restructured body still did not meet ECHR standards for effectively investigating death in custody cases. Whilst Silber found IHAT to be adequately independent in its reconstituted form, it was not fit for the purpose of investigating suspicious death cases. In fulfilment of its Article 2 obligations, the government needs to establish a full, fair and fearless investigation accessible to the victim's families and to the public into each death, which must look into and consider the immediate and surrounding circumstances in which each of the deaths occurred. 112 Silber cited common law and international law standards for investigating deaths in custody and affirmed the extended jurisdiction of the ECHR to the custody cases. 113 The Court found that IHAT failed to satisfy its Article 2 obligations, particularly due to delays in its proceedings. Moreover, IHAT was not accessible to the public or to victims' families, and the Court noted that the director of Service Prosecutions was not engaged in decision making on prosecutions. 114 Indeed, the divisional court ruled that due to its lack of independence, 'an inquisitorial inquiry modelled on a coroner's inquest' should be established for fatality cases and should be accessible to families of the deceased, therefore satisfying one criterion of an Article 2 compliant investigation. The OTP must decide whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, whether the case will be admissible before the Court and if it is in the interests of justice to proceed with the matter. 119 Schabas, supra n 7 at 180. 120 Schabas, supra n 5 at 541.
The parameters of the preliminary examination are such that the prosecutor must first consider the issue of jurisdiction, the components of which include subject matter, temporal jurisdiction, geophysical jurisdiction and jurisdiction over individuals. Although Iraq is not a state party to the Rome Statute, the Court would have jurisdiction with regard to the latter criterion (jurisdiction ratione personae) by virtue of the offender(s)' nationality. In 2006, the OTP developed a prosecutorial strategy focusing its efforts on the most serious crimes committed by 'those who bear the greatest responsibility, such as the leaders of the State or organisation allegedly responsible for those crimes.' 121 Schabas notes that a connection was made between the strategy to focus on senior leaders and the gravity threshold by the PreTrial Chamber in the Thomas Lubanga case, in which the Chamber stated 'that the gravity threshold was intended to ensure that the Court pursued cases only against "the most senior leaders" in any given situation under investigation.' 122 Pursuing cases only against those most responsible is based on the reasoning that such individuals would be best placed 'to stop the commission of those crimes,' and the gravity threshold is key to maximizing the Court's deterrent effect. 
